Total Supply — Pre-War → Strait Open → Recovery KPLER 70%
Current: 9.2 mbd offline · 11.5 available
0-6mo post-open: 3.1 offline · 17.6 available
6-12mo post-open: 2.5 offline · 18.2 available
12-36mo post-open: 1.9 offline · 18.8 available
Recovery Timeline BY PRODUCER
0-6mo post-open
6-12mo post-open
12-36mo post-open
Nation Flow vs. Pre-War ALL PHASES
Base Model Table — Kpler 70% Adjusted
| Disruption Type | Pre-War | Now (Kpler) | 0–6mo | 6–12mo | 12–36mo | NT Cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GCC — Strait (Saudi, UAE, etc.) | 9.7 | 0 | +4.9 | +1.8 | −1.2⁵ ↓ | 2.4 mbd |
| ⬦ Saudi E-W Pipeline net export · Yanbu bypass | 0.8¹ | 4.4 (+3.6) | 4.4 | ~0.8² ↓ | 0.8² | Restored 4/12 · Yanbu cap ~4 mbd |
| ⬦ UAE ADCOP Fujairah bypass | ~1.1³ | 1.5 (+0.4) | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | Near nameplate (1.5 mbd) |
| Iraq (Export + Basra) | 4.0 | 0 | +1.0 | +2.0 | +1.0 | 1.0 mbd |
| Iran (Domestic Depots) | 1.4 | 0 | +0.2 | +0.4 | +0.8 | 0.8 mbd |
| Oman (Logistics) * | 5.6 | 5.6* | 5.6* | 5.6 | 5.6 | War-risk only |
| Total Scope Returned | 20.7 mbd | 11.5 | 17.6 | 18.2 | 18.8 | 4.2 mbd |
* Oman / Sohar (5.6 mbd): Flows outside the Strait via Gulf of Oman. Physically uninterrupted. Counted in 20.7 mbd baseline and 6.2 mbd Kpler strait figure. Excluded from NT deficit. ~30% war-risk insurance premium is a structural cost headwind, not a supply disruption.
1 Saudi E-W Pipeline — pre-war baseline 0.8 mbd: Kpler confirmed Jan–Feb 2026 average was only ~770k bpd. Historical norm was 1.7–2.8 mbd, depressed by OPEC+ cuts. Wartime conversion to 7 mbd capacity = +3.6 mbd incremental net export (4.4 − 0.8). Full 7 mbd pipe capacity is limited in practice by Yanbu terminal: nominal 4.5 mbd, tested ~4 mbd, Vortexa wartime estimate ~3 mbd.
2 Dual-route capacity (critical caveat): When Hormuz reopens (6–12mo+), Saudi Arabia CANNOT simultaneously run E-W at 4.4 mbd AND resume full strait exports — total production capacity is ~12 mbd. Pre-war, KSA exported ~6.3 mbd total (5.5 mbd Hormuz + 0.8 mbd E-W). In recovery, E-W reverts to ~0.8 mbd baseline as crude flows back east to Juaymah/Ras Tanura. The E-W 12–36mo column therefore drops back to 0.8 mbd — it is a routing redirect, not new supply. Total 12–36mo recovers to ~18.8 mbd (partial recovery), not 26.1 mbd. Running both at full capacity simultaneously would require ~16+ mbd Saudi production (impossible — max capacity ~12 mbd).
5 GCC strait −1.2 mbd in 12–36mo: When E-W pipeline reverts to baseline (~0.8 mbd), Saudi crude flows back through Hormuz. However, the 12–36mo column reflects partial strait recovery only — GCC strait cumulative = 5.5 mbd vs 6.7 mbd in 6–12mo phase, a net reduction of 1.2 mbd as wartime routing unwinds. This is a routing redirect, not new production loss. Total GCC strait capacity at 12–36mo remains structurally capped at 7.3 mbd (9.7 pre-war minus 2.4 NT cap).
3 UAE ADCOP — pre-war baseline ~1.1 mbd: UAE diverted some volumes to Fujairah pre-war due to 2023–25 Houthi Red Sea disruptions. EIA estimated ~1.4–1.5 mbd utilized pre-war. Wartime net increase is modest (+0.4 mbd). ADCOP continues in recovery as a permanent routing preference — no reversal expected.
1 Saudi E-W Pipeline — pre-war baseline 0.8 mbd: Kpler confirmed Jan–Feb 2026 average was only ~770k bpd. Historical norm was 1.7–2.8 mbd, depressed by OPEC+ cuts. Wartime conversion to 7 mbd capacity = +3.6 mbd incremental net export (4.4 − 0.8). Full 7 mbd pipe capacity is limited in practice by Yanbu terminal: nominal 4.5 mbd, tested ~4 mbd, Vortexa wartime estimate ~3 mbd.
2 Dual-route capacity (critical caveat): When Hormuz reopens (6–12mo+), Saudi Arabia CANNOT simultaneously run E-W at 4.4 mbd AND resume full strait exports — total production capacity is ~12 mbd. Pre-war, KSA exported ~6.3 mbd total (5.5 mbd Hormuz + 0.8 mbd E-W). In recovery, E-W reverts to ~0.8 mbd baseline as crude flows back east to Juaymah/Ras Tanura. The E-W 12–36mo column therefore drops back to 0.8 mbd — it is a routing redirect, not new supply. Total 12–36mo recovers to ~18.8 mbd (partial recovery), not 26.1 mbd. Running both at full capacity simultaneously would require ~16+ mbd Saudi production (impossible — max capacity ~12 mbd).
5 GCC strait −1.2 mbd in 12–36mo: When E-W pipeline reverts to baseline (~0.8 mbd), Saudi crude flows back through Hormuz. However, the 12–36mo column reflects partial strait recovery only — GCC strait cumulative = 5.5 mbd vs 6.7 mbd in 6–12mo phase, a net reduction of 1.2 mbd as wartime routing unwinds. This is a routing redirect, not new production loss. Total GCC strait capacity at 12–36mo remains structurally capped at 7.3 mbd (9.7 pre-war minus 2.4 NT cap).
3 UAE ADCOP — pre-war baseline ~1.1 mbd: UAE diverted some volumes to Fujairah pre-war due to 2023–25 Houthi Red Sea disruptions. EIA estimated ~1.4–1.5 mbd utilized pre-war. Wartime net increase is modest (+0.4 mbd). ADCOP continues in recovery as a permanent routing preference — no reversal expected.
Saudi Dual-Route Capacity Analysis KEY CONSTRAINT
| Route | Pre-War | Now (Wartime) | Net Add | 12–36mo (Recovery) | Constraint |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strait of Hormuz (Saudi) | 5.5 mbd | ~0 | −5.5 | ~5.5 | Requires Hormuz open |
| E-W Pipeline (Yanbu) | 0.8 mbd | 4.4 mbd | +3.6 | ~0.8 | Yanbu terminal ~4 mbd cap |
| Total Saudi Exports | 6.3 mbd | ~4.4 | −1.9 | ~6.3 | Max prod. ~12 mbd |
⚠ CAN SAUDI ARABIA RUN BOTH ROUTES SIMULTANEOUSLY AT SCALE?
✗ NOT AT FULL WARTIME LEVELS: Running E-W at 4.4 mbd AND full strait exports (5.5 mbd) = 9.9 mbd total — requires ~12 mbd production with refineries. Saudi max capacity is ~12 mbd total. Physically possible at the margin, but leaves zero buffer and requires restarting all shut-in fields (Safaniya, Marjan, Zuluf, Abu Safa — all currently offline due to Iranian threats).
✓ HISTORICALLY YES (LOW E-W UTILIZATION): Pre-war Saudi ran both simultaneously — strait at 5.5 mbd + E-W at 0.8 mbd = 6.3 mbd total. That is the baseline. E-W was infrastructure held in reserve, not a parallel full-capacity export route.
→ RECOVERY REALITY: As Hormuz reopens (6–12mo+), crude flows back east to Juaymah/Ras Tanura (lower shipping cost, established tanker routes). E-W reverts to ~0.8 mbd logistics baseline. The 4.4 mbd wartime figure is a routing redirect, not new production. Total Saudi export capacity at recovery = pre-war ~6.3 mbd, not 6.3 + 4.4 = 10.7 mbd.
Sources: Kpler (Jan–Feb 2026 E-W baseline 0.8 mbd) · Fortune / S&P Global (7 mbd capacity, 2 mbd refinery draw, 5 mbd crude export) · EIA Hormuz Factsheet Feb 2026 (pre-war Saudi exports 5.5 mbd via Hormuz) · ENR / Vortexa (Yanbu terminal cap ~3–4 mbd practical)
Hormuz Pricing Model — Supply-Linked
mbd offline drawn from Supply Analysis · Russia/Ukraine 108-day blended rate · Brent & WTI · 4 phases
Russia/Ukraine 2022 — 108-Day Blended Rate Benchmark (Feb 24 – Jun 11)
Pre-War Close
(Feb 23 2022)
(Feb 23 2022)
Wtd. Avg
(108 days)
(108 days)
Avg Premium
Above Pre-War
Above Pre-War
Blended Rate
(÷ 1.5 mbd)
(÷ 1.5 mbd)
BRENT
MBD
MBD
$97.03
$113.83
+$16.80
$11.20/mbd
WTI
MBD
MBD
$92.24
$107.00
+$14.76
$9.84/mbd
Brent formula: 108-day weighted avg (Feb 24 – Jun 11, 2022, EIA) = $113.83 avg · Premium = $113.83 − $97.03 = +$16.80/bbl · Net mbd disrupted = 1.5 mbd → Brent rate = $11.20/bbl per net mbd
WTI formula: 108-day weighted avg (Feb 24 – Jun 11, 2022, EIA) = $107.00 avg · Premium = avg − $92.24 = +$14.76/bbl → WTI rate = $9.84/bbl per net mbd
Why 1.5 mbd? Russia exported ~5 mbd pre-war. Sanctions removed ~3 mbd from Western buyers, but India/China absorbed ~1.5 mbd at discount. Net global supply loss = ~1.5 mbd. This is the denominator for both blended rates.
Interpretation: The Brent blended rate ($11.20/mbd) is the primary calibration input. The WTI blended rate ($9.84/mbd) reflects the tighter US supply response and narrower Brent/WTI spread compression during the 2022 shock. Both capture spike + mean-reversion over the full 108-day window.
WTI formula: 108-day weighted avg (Feb 24 – Jun 11, 2022, EIA) = $107.00 avg · Premium = avg − $92.24 = +$14.76/bbl → WTI rate = $9.84/bbl per net mbd
Why 1.5 mbd? Russia exported ~5 mbd pre-war. Sanctions removed ~3 mbd from Western buyers, but India/China absorbed ~1.5 mbd at discount. Net global supply loss = ~1.5 mbd. This is the denominator for both blended rates.
Interpretation: The Brent blended rate ($11.20/mbd) is the primary calibration input. The WTI blended rate ($9.84/mbd) reflects the tighter US supply response and narrower Brent/WTI spread compression during the 2022 shock. Both capture spike + mean-reversion over the full 108-day window.
Hormuz Disruption — Pre-Event Closing Prices (Baseline for This Model)
Brent close
Day before Iran conflict
Day before Iran conflict
$73.19
Model base price →
WTI close
Day before Iran conflict
Day before Iran conflict
$67.29
Spread: −$5.90 Brent/WTI
Russia/Ukraine benchmark
Brent pre-war (Feb 23 2022)
Brent pre-war (Feb 23 2022)
$97.03
WTI: $92.24
Russia avg premium
(108-day blended)
(108-day blended)
+$16.80
÷ 1.5 mbd = $11.20/mbd
How the model works: Brent base = $73.19 (Iran conflict day-before close). WTI base = $67.29. Brent disruption rate = $11.20/mbd (Russia 108-day benchmark). WTI disruption rate = $9.84/mbd. Supply Disruption $ = rate × gross mbd offline. Brent = $73.19 + (Brent rate × gross mbd). WTI = $67.29 + (WTI rate × gross mbd). Sliders control gross mbd per phase directly.
Current
—
—
— mbd
0–6 months
—
—
— mbd
6–12 months
—
—
— mbd
12–36 months
—
—
— mbd
Brent & WTI — 4 Phases · Blended $/mbd Rate × Net mbd Offline
Brent forecast
WTI forecast
Live Brent
Live WTI
Current (crisis peak)
loading…
0–6 months
loading…
6–12 months
loading…
12–36 months
loading…
Supply Feed — Live from Model Controls
Buffer / Supply Response
Benchmark Rate & Base Prices
Gross MBD Offline per Phase
Adjust gross mbd offline per phase. Disruption premium = $11.20 × net mbd.